ABSTRACT Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an emerging data collection paradigm that exploits the potential of individual mobile devices to acquire mass data in a cost-effective manner. One of the important challenges in MCS application is to resist malicious users who provide false data to disturb the system. In the existing work, the reputation management scheme is an effective way to overcome the challenge. However, most reputation management schemes rely on a semi-honest server and process data in the plaintext domain without considering server security and user privacy. In this paper, we integrate the blockchain and edge computing in the MCS scenario to construct a credible and efficient blockchain-based MCS system, called BC-MCS. To resist malicious users, we present a privacy-preserving reputation management scheme based on the proposed system. Furthermore, we design a delegation protocol to solve the inherent problem of user dynamics in the MCS. The prototype system implemented on the Hyperledger Sawtooth and Android client demonstrates that our scheme can achieve higher utility and security levels in handling malicious users compared with the previous centralized reputation management schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of mobile devices equipped with various sensors (e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope, camera, and microphone), mobile crowdsensing (MCS) [1] is proposed to sense and collect data from participant users with the benefits of high volumes data acquisition and low maintenance cost. In a traditional crowdsensing application, there are three types of roles in the system: requesters, mobile sensing users (also called workers) and a centralized server. Requesters distribute sensing tasks to the centralized server, then the server recruits a set of appropriate sensing users to sense and collect data. After sensing users uploading sensed data, the server aggregates all received data and returns final aggregation result to requesters [2] .
In the MCS sensing process, the centralized server coordinating entire communication is too powerful without supervision. It is not known whether the server leaks users' sensitive
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information (e.g., sensing data) or whether it aggregates sensing data following the rules as specified by the requester. In most existing MCS systems, the centralized server is modeled as a semi-honest platform [3] , [4] , which means that it executes the prescribed protocol honestly but is curious about user privacy. In the real world, however, the central server may be malicious because of malware infection or internal attack. Once the server is compromised, user privacy and aggregation correctness cannot be guaranteed. The certificateless cryptographic technique [5] , [6] is an effective way to overcome some security issues of a centralized server, but it cannot solve the single point of failure, which is an unavoidable problem for the centralized server. Thus, the traditional MCS architecture, which relies on a centralized and opaque server, is vulnerable to malicious attacks and internal compromise.
Recently, the development of blockchain technologies makes it possible to overcome the weaknesses of the centralized server (vulnerability and opacity). Blockchain is a distributed ledger that is maintained by a peer-to-peer network where all operations are public and transparent [7] . By introducing blockchain technology to MCS scenario, we can replace the powerful centralized server with a reliable decentralized computing environment. Many applications have utilized blockchain technology to construct credible computing platform, such as decentralized crowdsourcing platform [8] , fault-tolerant incentivization system [9] and secure knowledge discovery platform [10] . Nevertheless, due to the limited storage space and computing resource of mobile devices, blockchain cannot be applied to MCS directly. Inspired by edge computing, which is proposed to meet strict low-latency communication requirements [11] , we can integrate edge computing and blockchain to propose an efficient and reliable blockchain-based MCS system, called BC-MCS. There have been many applications to combine the edge computing and blockchain in other scenarios, such as the secure IoT framework [12] and vehicular data sharing system [13] .
However, there are still two unsolved challenges existing in the BC-MCS scenario. The first is the challenge of malicious users. Due to the openness of BC-MCS system, anyone who owns a mobile device can become a sensing user or requester in a typical BC-MCS application. Since sensing users can get benefits for their resource consumption, it is unavoidable that some malicious users upload false data without performing sensing task in order to disrupt the system intentionally or gain undeserved rewards [14] , [15] . Furthermore, sensing data often contains users' private information (e.g., users' location and device info), malicious users might collude to violate the privacy of honest users. Thus, the goal of defending against malicious users and protecting user privacy in BC-MCS should be achieved simultaneously.
The other challenge is the adaptiveness to user dynamics. User dynamics means that the user who has accepted the sensing task might leave the system without providing sensing data. In this case, the traditional MCS system has to forego collecting data from off-line sensing users or wait for off-line sensing users to rejoin the system. The feature of user dynamics severely weakens the utility and real-time capability of the system. Thus, it is necessary for a practical BC-MCS system to adapt to the user dynamics scenario.
To prevent malicious users, researchers have proposed many feasible solutions [15] - [18] . Among these solutions, the majority adopts a reputation management scheme, which is effective in dealing with malicious users. Originally, the reputation management scheme aims to provide the measure of confidence that users will supply reliable service [16] , [19] , [20] . The basic idea is that every user owns a reputation score which can be changed by the reliability of provided data in each task. In this way, the honest or malicious user can be identified by the different reputation levels after performing a series of tasks. However, existing reputation schemes rarely discuss the privacy problem. Only a few works [21] , [22] research the user privacy problem in the reputation management process. In [21] and [22] , somewhathomomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme and blind signature techniques are used for the communication between sensing users and the central server, respectively. The SHE scheme allows the system to update user reputation scores over encrypted data without revealing any information about sensing data. The reputation scheme in [22] uses blind signature techniques for maintaining user anonymity in order to achieve the privacy-preserving goal. These two schemes both utilize cryptographic primitives to resolve the conflict between user privacy and reputation management, but expensive cryptographic technology increases the overhead of computing for sensing users with mobile devices. Furthermore, these schemes, relying on a centralized server, cannot guarantee system transparency and are not suitable for dynamic user scenario.
Regarding the challenge of user dynamics, it is not only the inherent nature of the MCS system but also the barrier to hinder practicability of the reputation scheme in BC-MCS. In the existing work, most reputation schemes [21] , [22] manage users' reputation in the static scenario. The static scenario means that users are certain to provide sensing data with an acceptable time after receiving the task. In [16] , a privacy-preserving reputation system based on secret sharing is proposed to meet the requirement of user dynamics and decentralization. This scheme can apply to dynamic users scenario by running an efficient delegation protocol in P2P networks. The limitation of this scheme is that the effective method to update reputation score is not provided and the scheme cannot directly apply to the MCS scenario.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic and privacy-preserving reputation management scheme based on blockchain for mobile crowdsensing to overcome the defects of existing schemes. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• To overcome the security problem of centralized server in traditional MCS application, we utilize blockchain technology to propose an efficient BC-MCS system which serves as the open and supervised crowdsensing platform.
• Based on BC-MCS, we present a practical privacypreserving reputation management scheme in order to defend against malicious users. In our scheme, an effective reputation evaluation system is built according to the reliability of user data, which is determined by the degree of data distortion, data consistency, local rating, and contextual factors. To preserve user privacy, we design a two-stage reputation update scheme using additive secret sharing without the disclosure of user privacy (sensing data, aggregation result, and requester's feedback) in the public blockchain environment.
• Due to user dynamics in BC-MCS, we improve the basic privacy-preserving reputation management scheme by designing a delegation protocol, so that it has no impact on the system when recruited users leave the system without contributing sensed data.
• We implement the prototype system of our scheme based on Hyperledger Sawtooth and Android client. Extensive experiments show that our scheme is effective and practical to resist malicious user in the dynamic BC-MCS scenario. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the related work of privacy-preserving reputation management schemes in MCS scenario in Section II. Section III introduces our BC-MCS system and gives an overview of the sensing process in BC-MCS. In Section IV-B, we present our reputation management scheme. Section VI gives security analysis for our scheme and Section V presents the delegation protocol to deal with user dynamics. The cost analysis and performance evaluation based on a prototype system are presented in Section VII. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In traditional MCS systems, it is a challenge for the open system to deal with malicious users while preserving user privacy. In the literature, the reputation management scheme is a fast and effective method to solve this problem [23] , many relevant approaches targeting different privacy requirement have been proposed [21] , [22] . We summarize the differences between our scheme and the existing privacy-preserving reputation management schemes in Table 1 . In [22] , the authors build a privacy-preserving provenance model to evaluate the trustworthiness of sensing data. They also propose an anonymous reputation management protocol to achieve the goal of ''trust without identity''. The protocol uses blind signature to generate different pseudonym certificate and the reputation scores for users are updated according to the pseudonym certificate on the following redeeming phase. The scheme can achieve anonymity between the user identity and his/her sensed data, however, it performs all the process in plaintext environment and ignores the privacy of data content. In [21] , Ma et al. develop a novel method to manage user reputation in MCS based on the deviation of sensing data from the final aggregation result. To preserve user privacy, they use somewhat-homomorphic encryption to encrypt sensing data, which guarantees the entire operation on sensing data can be performed in the ciphertext domain. The features of homomorphic encryption can resolve the conflict between preserving privacy and handling malicious users, nevertheless, it causes expensive computation overhead for the system and mobile users. Despite the effectiveness in resisting malicious sensing users, all these schemes rely on the centralized server to coordinate each sensing process and do not consider the malicious server behavior.
Recently, blockchain has gained popularity as the underlying trusted computation platform in various scenarios [24] - [26] , the great majority of these applications replace the too powerful centralized server with the distributed and reliable blockchain platform. In MCS applications, several privacy-preserving schemes based on blockchain have been proposed to deal with malicious behaviors [2] , [9] , [10] , [27] . Note that the malicious behaviors mean the behaviors of malicious central server and malicious users. In [2] , Wang et al. propose a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism based on blockchain to select high-quality users and resist malicious server. Due to the features of blockchain, the scheme gets rid of the honest or semi-honest central server. The cryptocurrency built on blockchain is used to motivate users to provide quality data. The scheme utilizes the k-anonymity approach to protect user privacy since the transaction information in blockchain is public for each user. Nevertheless, the latency of this scheme is high and it cannot apply in large-scale MCS scenarios. In [27] and [9] , they utilize blockchain to build semi-anonymous multi-party interactions in MCS to maintain user privacy and design an incentive mechanism to prevent malicious behavior using smart contract, an emerging blockchain-based programming scheme where code execution is reliable and transparent.
Although blockchain is an effective tool to overcome the challenge of malicious servers, its application in interactive mobile services (e.g., MCS) is still limited. There are two problems we need to solve, efficiency and user dynamics. In [28] , Xiong et al. consider that the blockchain does not apply in the resource-limited mobile device because the consensus algorithm consumes substantial CPU time and energy. For this situation, they propose the concept that integrates edge computing and blockchain. By introducing edge computing [29] , we can deploy a number of edge nodes accepting offloaded work from near mobile devices. All complex computation in the blockchain, including PoW consensus algorithm, hashing, and encryption, are performed by edge nodes equipped with mass storage and enough computing ability. User dynamics is the inherent feature of mobile network application (e.g., mobile ad-hoc network, WSN, and P2P system) since each legitimate user can leave or join the network at any time. In [16] , Clark et al. present delegation protocols and design dynamic, privacy-preserving reputation system in decentralized environments. This system can preserve user reputation privacy and adapt to dynamic networks. However, they do not give an effective method to update user reputation.
Therefore in this paper, inspired by [2] , [16] , [21] , and [30] , we intend to design a dynamic, privacy-preserving reputation management scheme for mobile crowdsensing based on the blockchain.
III. THE BC-MCS SYSTEM
In this section, we review the preliminary and introduce our BC-MCS system architecture and the privacy requirement. Then, we analyze the possible threats from adversary and give a threat model. The notations used in this paper are listed in Table 2 . 
A. PRELIMINARY
In our dynamic and privacy-preserving reputation management scheme, we utilize additive secret sharing defined in [16] to achieve the goal of preserving user privacy. Additive secret sharing is an efficient solution to the secure multiparty computation problem, which can realize the data aggregation on inputs from multiple users without disclosure of individual input. The idea of additive secret sharing is used in many of the existing literature [3] , [31] . The detailed definition is introduced as follows.
Definition (Additive Secret Sharing): Z q is a finite field of prime order q. Given a secret s ∈ Z q , s can be divided into n additive secret shares s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n such that s = s 1 + s 2 + · · · + s n . if owning n shares, one can recovery s easily by summing the shares together. The shares generation method is that s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s n−1 are chosen at random from Z q then s n = s − s 1 − s 2 − · · · − s n−1 .
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our BC-MCS mobile crowdsensing system is inspired by the EC-MCS system model [21] , [32] , [33] , which utilizes the edge computing to overcome the challenges of time delays and high bandwidth costs in traditional MCS application. The general architecture of our BC-MCS system is shown in Fig. 1 . We can see that BC-MCS system consists of four main components.
• Task distribution center (TDC): The TDC performs task distribution function which includes receiving sensing task from the requester then recruiting quality sensing users to collect data. The specific scheme of user recruitment is out of the scope of this paper. There are many privacy-preserving user recruitment schemes have been proposed [34] - [36] , all of which are built on the semi-honest model. • Key distribution center (KDC): The KDC is responsible for maintaining and distributing secret keys to preserve user privacy.
• Edge computing node (EN): The EN is the basic computing devices in edge computing, which is equipped with mass storage and powerful computing ability. Meanwhile, the EN plays a role of blockchain computing node in the blockchain environment, storing whole ledger data and executing consensus algorithm. The data aggregation and reputation update are performed by ENs.
• Participant users: There are two types of participant users in the BC-MCS scenario, requester and sensing user. They are in charge of publishing sensing task and providing sensed data with mobile devices, respectively. Without the concern of privacy problem, we give a formal representation of reputation management process in the BC-MCS system. Let requester and sensing user, two types of user role in BC-MCS, be denoted by p and u respectively. All p in the system form requester set P and all u form sensing user set U. Let |P| = m and |U| = n. Each sensing user u i ∈ U possesses global reputation score r i , which is stored in blockchain publicly. The process of reputation management consists of two continuous processes: sensing process and reputation update process. In the sensing process, a requester p j ∈ P first publishes the task via the TDC, then each recruited sensing user u i ∈ U accepts the sensing task and provides sensed data v i . The BC-MCS platform aggregates all sensing data {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } to generate aggregation result v a and return v a to p j . During the reputation update process, p j gives the feedback r ji on the data quality of each v i ∈ {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. r ji is also called local reputation score stored by p j locally. When u i completes N sensing tasks published by requesters {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N }, the system aggregates all r ji from {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N } to update the global reputation score for u i .
C. PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
The privacy requirement in our scheme contains sensing user privacy and requester privacy. VOLUME 7, 2019 • Sensing user privacy. During the sensing process, the sensing data{v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } provided by users should be kept confidential from other users in the system. Only requester and sensing user can learn the original sensing data.
• Requester privacy. When BC-MCS aggregates sensing data {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } from all users, the final aggregation result v a is not exposed to anyone except the requester. Moreover, even though malicious users collude with some ENs, they cannot infer v a through public information. In the reputation update process, requester's feedback (local reputation score r ji ) on the data quality of v i is individual information which cannot be learned by malicious users.
D. THREAT MODEL
In our security model, the KDC is considered fully trusted since the KDC possesses all secret keys in the system. The TDC is honest-but-curious, which means that it will recruit appropriate sensing users honestly in each sensing task, but try to infer extra privacy of users based on the information it has. We assume ENs, the computing nodes in blockchain, and sensing users can be malicious. Generally, there are three main ways for adversaries to attack our BC-MCS system: T1 For the server side, the adversary can attack several ENs to control the overall process of reputation management; T2 For the user side, the adversary can provide wrong data to disturb the system; T3 For the communication inside BC-MCS, the adversary can collude with a part of users or ENs to infer the sensed data from other sensing users. We assume that an adversary has sufficient power to compromise any ENs or sensing users in the system. In addition, there are some assumptions based on blockchain technology. For example, the adversary is not able to control more than 51% computing nodes (ENs) in the blockchain. The public key can identify the user in blockchain and the signature cannot be forged without the user's private key. All participants communicate with each other via secure channels and the minority users in the system have malicious behaviors, that is the ratio of malicious users is less than 50%.
IV. OUR REPUTATION MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In this section, we show the two processes in our reputation management scheme, sensing process and reputation update process. The key problem to solve in sensing process is how to generate aggregation result v a by aggregating sensing data {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } in blockchain environment without revealing the original value of v i . In the reputation update process, the challenge is building an effective data quality evaluation method then updating user reputation without the disclosure of sensing data v i and requester feedback r ji . At the end of the section, we give an analysis about the effectiveness and security of our scheme.
A. THE SENSING PROCESS IN BC-MCS
Here, we give a detailed description of the sensing process in our BC-MCS system. Recall that sensed data v i from u i is considered as private information, which should be kept confidential from other participants except for u i and p. This can be done via the additive secret sharing defined in [16] . The core idea of the sensing process in a privacy-preserving manner is that the KDC distributes n shares, derived from p's secret key s, to each sensing user u i ∈ U. u i adds a share serving as a binding factor to his/her data for blinding. All subsequent operations are performed on blinding data. Finally, the impact of the share on aggregation result can be eliminated by recovering p's secret key. Note that the terms ''share'' and ''blinding factor'' refer to the same thing (s i ) in the paper. Fig. 2 illustrates the detailed sensing process in BC-MCS. There are six phases in this process, which includes twelve steps indicated as (1)- (12) in Fig. 2 . 
1) ISSUE OF KEY AND TASK
(step (1)- (3)): First of all, p sends legitimate certificate registered in advance to the KDC and requests the KDC to generate secret key s ∈ Z p for this sensing task. Then, p publishes the crowdsensing task to the nearest EN.
2) SENSING TASK ASSIGNMENT
(step (4)- (7)): The sensing task is forwarded to the TDC by ENs. The TDC recruits n quality sensing users to carry out the crowdsensing task published by p. In addition, p generates n shares from s such that s = s 1 + s 2 + s 3 + · · · + s n , which serve as blinding factors. After that, p distributes n shares to n sensing users via secure communication channel (e.g., KDC).
3) DATA BLINDING (step (8)- (9)): After receiving crowdsensing task and one share, the recruited sensing users start collecting data with mobile devices. In general, we can suppose that v i is an integer. To achieve the goal of preserving privacy, each sensing user u i utilizes share s i to generate blinded data v i = v i + s i . Then, the blinded data v i is encapsulated into a blockchain transaction and it is sent to the nearest EN.
4) BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTION VERIFICATION
(step (10)): After receiving blockchain transactions from all sensing users, the EN begins to execute smart contract automatically. The EN checks the validity of transactions, including inspecting transaction format, verifying user's signature and auditing the validity of blinded data. The invalid transactions which failed in validity check are aborted and the valid transactions are recorded in blockchain by the EN.
5) DATA AGGREGATION
(step (10)- (11)): When all sensing users have provided sensing data and ENs have recorded transactions into the blockchain, the process of aggregating all sensed data begins to execute as specified in the smart contract. Here the weighted average of all sensing data will be computed by smart contract, where the weight of each sensing data is the sensing user's global reputation score r i stored in blockchain publicly. The computed output v a is considered as the final aggregation result for requester p. Due to the existence of share in v i , we just get the blinded aggregation result v a as follows:
After obtaining v a , ENs save it to the blockchain.
6) UNBLINDING AGGREGATION RESULTS
(step (12) 
Note that r i is a decimal between the range of [0, 1]. In (1, 2), we perform many floating point arithmetic between the big number (e.g., v i , s i ) and the decimal (e.g., r i ). In order to avoid ''floating-point rounding error'', we must rely on high precision floating-point calculation to aggregate data. Recall that we assume the sensed data is the integer. This is because the additive secret sharing used in the data aggregation cannot protect the fractional part of decimal data. In the practical scenario [3] , we can use a scaling factor Q which is multiples of 10, to transform fractional data v (sensed data or reputation score) to an integerv = vQ. After the computing completes, the result v result is scaled down by v result = f (v) /Q. The scaling factor Q should be large enough such that all fractional data can be scaled up into the integer.
B. THE REPUTATION UPDATE PROCESS IN BC-MCS
The reputation management process is performed once sensing users completing the sensing process. Inspired by PowerTrust system proposed in [17] , our reputation management scheme is divided into two stages: local reputation evaluation and global reputation update. We calculate the global reputation score for each user by aggregating the feedback (local reputation score) from requesters. The rationale behind the idea is that one requester can only give personal feedback on data service based on the historical interaction with sensing users whereas aggregating all feedback from multiple requesters could make a comprehensive evaluation for the data service provider (sensing users). Essentially, the global reputation score is a comprehensive evaluation for the user's reputation while local reputation score reflects requester's feedback for the data quality in a sensing task. In this case, when a sensing user provides his/her sensed data, the requester will evaluate the reliability of data and give feedback (local reputation score) to use in the future global reputation update process. We introduce each stage of our reputation management scheme in detail in this section.
1) LOCAL REPUTATION EVALUATION
Local reputation score, provided by a requester p j ∈ P, is the reliability evaluation on users' sensed data during the sensing task published by p j . In other words, requester gives individual feedback on sensing users' data service in each task. There are many existing methods for evaluating data reliability [21] , [22] , [30] , [37] . Inspired by the method proposed in [30] , we develop a new reputation evaluation method to accurately estimate the local reputation score of sensing users according to their data reliability.
After fulfilling a sensing task, u i 's new local reputation score r new ji is evaluated by p j . The value of r ji or r new ji is in the range of [0, 1], which represents that the local reputation score of an honest user or a malicious user always providing false data will gradually converge to 1 or 0, respectively. Given the feature of gradient and convergence in local reputation, we utilize the Gompertz function [38] in reputation management to calculate the local reputation of sensing users
where G(x) is a typical Gompertz function to describe local reputation growth
Here, λ is the growth rate parameter to control the convergence speed on local reputation according to the real system. R i is the description of u i 's data reliability in the sensing task, which provides the foundation to evaluate the local reputation.
Intuitively, within each sensing task, the assessment of data reliability is influenced by various factors. We define the following four factors to assess the data reliability: the degree of data distortion d i , the data consistency c i , the local rating l ji , and other factors η. Their detailed definitions are as follows. VOLUME 7, 2019 Data Distortion: Data distortion represents the difference between observation and truth. We use the deviation of sensed data v i from v a to denote the degree of data distortion. v a is the final aggregation result held by p j , which is considered as truth data. We calculate the squared difference between v i and v a , then the result is normalized as the deviation of
Here, b L and b U represent the lower bound and the upper bound of sensing data range respectively, requester p j uses it to normalize the deviation and scale d i to the range of [0, 1]. Specifically, there is a negative correlation between the deviation of v i from v a and the reliability of v i .
Data Consistency: The estimation of data consistency is important for detecting inconsistency among data in the collection. This factor is based on the fact that in a typical MCS application, the multiple sensing data that describe the same object might be collected for one sensing task. Given different data sources (sensing users), there is a consistent or conflicting relationship between two arbitrary sensing data for the same task. Similar data is considered consistent for the task, while dissimilar data is conflicting with each other. We think the sensing data is high-quality when it is consistent with most sensing data from users. Here, we introduce the concept of similarity [30] . Particularly, for two sensing data v i and v k , we define similarity score S(v i , v k ) to represent the degree of similarity between these two data. S(v i , v k ) is a scalar quantity in the range of [-1, 1], where -1 means entirely dissimilar with each other and 1 means that the two data are identical. As for specific similarity computing methods, there are several schemes proposed in the literature [22] , [39] , [40] . We give an example of computing
where β is the consistency sensitivity parameter which adjusts the weight of the data consistency factor's influence on local reputation growth. The part e − 1 |U | i∈U r i of the equation contains two variables, |U| and i∈U r i . The meaning of this part is that the more sensing users in set U, the more data can be provided meanwhile the more accurate judgment we might get about whether the data is reliable. Thus, we consider the scale of U as a variable to influence data consistency. In the same way, the high-quality user group can contribute more similar data, which has a positive impact on data consistency. We use the sum of all sensing users' global reputation to characterize the quality of U.
Local Rating: The local rating reflects the credibility of a user compared with other users who have interacted with p j . The rationale behind this factor is that in historical interactions with p j , a user with satisfactory behaviors tends to maintain a high-level reputation in the future transaction (contribute more reliable data). Specifically, the local rating l i of the user is defined as
where γ is the rating sensitivity parameter which represents the weight of the local rating factor in local reputation evaluation.
Contextual Factor: In addition to the factors mentioned above, other spatiotemporal or personal factors could be taken into account toward evaluating the reliability of data. For instance, the specific sensing task is strict in location and time, which means that the sensing data from the expected location might be more reliable than that from a remote location. Similarly, sensing data collected before a given deadline usually best meets the task time requirement. Some MCS tasks might also consider data diversity and sensing frequency. These factors affecting data reliability are considered contextual, the type and quantity of them are related to the specific system. Thus, contextual factors are selected according to the actual system scenario. Let η denote the contextual factors which need to be considered in the system. Generally, η is represented as η = η w · η v , where η v is the value of contextual factor and η w is the weight of contextual factor in computing data reliability.
Given the factors we build above, we can obtain the data reliability of v i as follows:
where α is the distortion sensitivity parameter to represent the weight of data distortion factor. Moreover, sensitivity parameters of all factors need to meet the condition, α + β + γ + η w = 1. From (3)(8), we can see that d i , l i and η is in the range of [0, 1], only the value of c i can be negative. That means if we expect the local reputation of a malicious user decreases constantly, the data consistency factor must become the main factor in evaluating data reliability. Therefore, we suggest β should be maximum in all sensitivity parameters in the effective reputation management scheme. From (3), we can see that the value of local reputation is in the range of [0, 1]. For new users registered in the system, we set their initial local reputation score to 0.5. In other words, the requester uses 0.5 as the initial value to evaluate new local reputation sore for users who have not been recruited as sensing users by the requester. Additionally, this local reputation evaluation scheme can guarantee the reputation score converges to 0 or 1 for honest users or malicious users, respectively. Based on the reputation evaluation scheme above, we give the full process of local reputation evaluation as follows, 1) Once the system completing data aggregation, the requester p j can obtain final aggregation result v a by (2) . Besides, p j uses the share derived from s to remove the blind factor in each v i , which is stored in blockchain publicly, and obtain all origin sensing data v i of u i ∈ U.
2) For each v i , p j computes the data reliability R i using (8) and evaluates new local reputation score for each u i ∈ U. Note than all operations here are locally completed by p j in the plaintext domain.
2) GLOBAL REPUTATION UPDATE
In this way, we cannot correlate the change to u i 's global reputation with a specific requester. Here, N is chosen based on the actual situation. We utilize the additive secret sharing to implement global reputation update in blockchain without revealing r ji from N requesters. The detailed process of global reputation update for u i is described as follows, 1) When N requesters finish local reputation evaluation for u i , the global reputation update for u i starts. N requesters ask the KDC to generate N additive secret shares as blinding factors b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n respectively, such that
2) Let r ji be the increment between r new ji and r ji , which is computed by r ji = r new ji − r ji . Note that r ji can be positive or negative. After receiving one share b j , each requester p j utilizes b j to generate blinded local reputation increment r ji for u i , r ji = r ji + b j . Then, r ji is encapsulated into a blockchain transaction and is sent to the nearest EN.
3) After receiving blockchain transactions from N requesters, the EN checks the validity of transactions and begins to execute global reputation update as specified in smart contract automatically. The update process is performed by averaging the local reputation increment for u i from N requesters and applying the average incremental changes in old global reputation score. Due to the existence of blinding factor, ENs can preserve the privacy of local reputation changes, meanwhile, computing the new global reputation score r new i for u i as follows, 
After obtaining r new i , ENs replace the old global reputation score with r new i and save it to the blockchain.
V. THE DYNAMIC BC-MCS SCHEME
The feature of ''dynamic'' means that users often leave the system after accepting sensing tasks without providing sensing data. Due to the limitation of additive secret sharing, our basic BC-MCS scheme cannot be applied to user dynamic scenario. This is because the secret key cannot be reconstructed when any share held by a user is lost. Additionally, the requester cannot obtain the sensed data from off-line users until the sensing users become online again, the subsequent reputation update process cannot be performed without sensed data. To overcome the challenge of user dynamics, we consider the share of the off-line user as a secret key and delegate the sensing task of off-line user to a set of on-line users. Through aggregating the sensing data from the set of on-line users, we consider the aggregation data as the origin sensing data of off-line users to participate in the subsequent computation which is same as the basic BC-MCS scheme. In the following, we give a four-stage delegation protocol to build the dynamic BC-MCS scheme.
A. DELEGATION SET SELECTION
Based on the local or global reputation, the sensing user u i selects M quality sensing users u d , called delegation user, to form a delegation set D.
B. SECRET SHARES DISTRIBUTION
When u i is going to leave the system after accepting the sensing task and secret key s i for aggregation from requester, u i or the KDC generates M random shares s id derived from s i so that M · s i = s i1 + s i2 + · · · + s iM . Then, u i or the KDC distributes M shares s id and signature to each delegation users in D, respectively. 
In contrast with v i provided by sensing user u i in the basic BC-MCS scheme, obviously, here we use the average of sensed data from all delegation users u d to replace off-line u i 's real sensed data. The subsequent data aggregation and reputation update process are performed as specified by the basic BC-MCS scheme.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show our BC-MCS system is a reliable and practical platform to resist malicious users in mobile crowdsensing and the system itself is secure under the threat T1-T3.
Proposition 1: The BC-MCS system cannot be compromised by the external or internal attacks for ENs. (T1)
It is obvious that the reliability of BC-MCS depends on the security of underlying blockchain. Generally, we suppose that adversary cannot control more than 51% of computing nodes in the blockchain. In BC-MCS, ENs serve as computing nodes. The external or internal attacks for ENs are not able to compromise the system as long as more than half of ENs are not controlled.
Proposition 2: In contrast to the traditional semi-honest server model, our BC-MCS system performing all crowdsensing tasks is open and trustworthy. (T1)
The trustworthiness of BC-MCS comes from that all operations in BC-MCS is specified in the smart contract, which is always executed correctly on blockchain (Hyperledger Sawtooth) and the computed result is stored in blockchain publicly. Each user in BC-MCS can verify operations and result. Furthermore, through performing the consensus algorithm, the contract states can achieve synchronization between each blockchain node (ENs), it is traceable and tamper-proof.
Proposition 3: Whether always uploading false data or uploading false data and real sensed data alternately, malicious users can be identified effectively. (T2)
In the local reputation evaluation process, we give a novel reputation evaluation scheme, which is affected by four factors: data distortion, data consistency, local rating and contextual factor. Among these factors, data consistency is the major factor in decreasing the reputation of malicious users and identify malicious behaviors. The equation (6) shows the value of c i would drop severely when false data conflicts with most other data. That means if malicious users always provide false data, requesters will give negative feedback and the reputation score will decrease constantly. Additionally, negative feedback impacts a user's reputation score more than positive feedback. This corresponds with common sense that the consistent good behaviors can build up a high reputation, however, a few bad performances could make the reputation fall to a low level [22] . Thus, as long as the majority users keep honest, the reputation of malicious users who alternately provide false data and real sensed data will converge to 0 eventually. When there are w malicious sensing users colluding to infer the aggregation result and the original sensing data of other honest users, the sensing data v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v w and blind factors (additive secret shares) s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s w are known to malicious users. Additionally, the global reputation scores r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n are always public to each user in the system. From (1)(2), the aggregation result can be computed in two ways. Consider v a is not given, the adversary computes v a by
. (11) Or when v a is given, the adversary computes v a by
Thus, only n i=w+1 r i ·v i or n i=w+1 r i ·s i is known, the aggregation result v a can be computed. That means the adversary must know the sensing data or blind factors of all honest sensing users to compute the aggregation result, otherwise v a is not learned even though n − 1 users collude to violate system privacy.
Consider the worst situation in which the aggregation result v a in each sensing task is leaked to the adversary. Let r k i be the global reputation score of user u i before completing kth sensing task, and v k a be the aggregation result in kth sensing task. According to (1), the adversary can construct
After arrangement, (13) becomes
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where v T and y T represent the transposes of v and y respectively. The original sensing data v can be determined by A −1 y T when each sensing user provides the same data in each task and A is linearly independent. When n − w = 1, which means that there is only one honest user in the system, the adversary can recover v based on the learned y. When n − w > 1, which means that there are more than one honest users in the system, it is impossible to guarantee that n − w honest users provide the same data in subsequent n − w sensing task, thus the adversary cannot recover the sensing data of each user.
Proposition 5: In the entire reputation update process, requester's local reputation score for users is not disclosed to other participants in BC-MCS. (T3)
The user's local reputation scores are always protected against the adversary in the entire reputation update process. First, the local reputation scores are stored in requester's device and local evaluation is also performed on the requester side without any interaction with other participants. Then, the user's global reputation is updated based on the average of N local reputation scores in the blind form such as r ji + b j . Recall that b j is selected randomly as blinding factor which is only known by the requester. From Proposition 4, we know the additive secret share is secure, the adversary cannot recover the local reputation for the specific user and only know the global reputation which is public to each participant in BC-MCS.
VII. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION

A. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we implement a prototype system of our BC-MCS scheme based on Hyperledger Sawtooth, an Intel open source platform for building, deploying, and running distributed ledgers [41] . The information stored in the blockchain includes user public key, user signature, global reputation score, user operation, and basic block data. Some important fields of the block information are listed in Table 3 . Extensive experiments are conducted to show the effectiveness of our scheme. First, we analyze the computation cost of our scheme and give a comparison with other existing preserving-privacy reputation management schemes. Next, we evaluate the performance of BC-MCS for fulfilling a sensing task, including data aggregation, reputation update, and dynamic delegation. Finally, we analyze the parameter sensitivity in our scheme and simulate different malicious user situation to examine the robustness of our scheme in resisting malicious attack.
Our prototype system is deployed on the local private blockchain, which consists of 5 computing nodes with Intel Core i7-4790 CPU 3.60GHz, 4GB memory, and Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit operation system. The smart contract is implemented in Python and consists of more than 1000 lines of code. The client application is developed on a Huawei Honor 9 device equipped with 8-core 2.36GHz processor, 4GB memory, and running Android 8.0.0. For the additive secret sharing, we set the order q of Z q as 2 127 − 1. The data aggregation and reputation management in our BC-MCS framework are inspired by B-PPRM scheme proposed in [21] , we simulate the B-PPRM scheme as the comparison with our scheme.
In the following experiments, we build the scenario of city temperature monitoring. This scenario consists of 10 requesters and 100 sensing users, each user performs 100 sensing tasks. Suppose that in each sensing task, users sense ambient temperature with mobile devices and provide sensed data to the system. We use temperature data 1 of Guangzhou (China) in the past 3 years as the simulated sensing data. The range of temperature data is [3, 39] • C. Mathematically, that is |P| = 10, |U| = 100, n t = 100, b L = 3 and b U = 39.
B. COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON
After a sensing user u i accepts the sensing task, it requires one communication with the KDC to ask for blinding factor. Note that the blinding factor for u i is derived from requester's secret key. When finishing data collection, u i should perform the additive blinding operation to generate blinded data. The complexity of additive secret sharing, which only includes one additive operation with a share, can be negligible compared with the costly encryption scheme in other schemes. The last sensing step for u i is uploading blinded data to the nearest EN. For the following operation (data aggregation and reputation update), it is not necessary for u i to participate. Thus, In our BC-MCS system with n sensing users, all user clients perform 2n communication in each sensing task. The data aggregation is performed in blockchain after sensing users provide data to the EN. Let n e be the number of ENs, n e represents the number of blockchain computing nodes (ENs). The computation complexity of aggregation operation is O(n) + O(n e ), where O(n) means the complexity of aggregation for n sensing data and O(n e ) means the complexity of block generation in blockchain with n e nodes. Since n e is far less than n, we can neglect the cost of blockchain consensus algorithm in BC-MCS scenario. Thus, the computation complexity of our scheme can achieve O(n) in the large-scale user network. In the reputation management phase, the complexity of local evaluation for n users is O(n) and the complexity of global update in blockchain is O(n e ).
Our reputation management scheme aims to protect user privacy and resist malicious behaviors, therefore we compare the features and complexity of our scheme with some typical privacy-preserving reputation management schemes. The comparison results are shown in Table 4 .
Among these schemes, we can see that our scheme can achieve the least communication traffic in user clients. As for the method to preserve user privacy, we use the additive secret sharing to mask original sensed data with a secret share. In this way, the energy consumption in mobile devices is considered low which can be negligible compared to the other costly encryption methods. The computation complexity of our scheme in a few users scenario is a little higher than the other schemes for the usage of blockchain. The blockchain technology is used as the underlying system in our privacy-preserving reputation scheme. Generally, the speed of block generation can become a performance bottleneck in blockchain application due to the CPU-intensive consensus algorithm. For example, the block in Bitcoin [7] , [42] is generated about 10 minutes on average and the difficulty of block generation in Ethereum [43] - [45] is adjustable, but it is still based on the costly PoW consensus algorithm. The Hyperledger Sawtooth we adopt in the system uses a novel consensus algorithm, PoET, which is not CPU-intensive and is efficient to deal with a large network. Additionally, the Bitcoin only supports very limited script to customize the blockchain behavior. Both of Ethereum and Hyperledger Sawtooth support Turing-complete smart contract, but Ethereum only supports one programming language, Solidity, whereas Hyperledger Sawtooth provides SDK in several languages for developers. The experiment in section VII-C will show that the cost of consensus algorithm and block generation can be minimized in our scheme.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
First of all, we evaluate the average time of sensed data aggregation process. In BC-MCS, sensing users always upload data to the nearest ENs and ENs execute data aggregation on the blockchain. Since the time of data collection and uploading depends on the real application scenario, we can neglect the communication time between users and ENs. Fig. 3 shows the aggregation time t a varying with the number of sensing users n. For BC-MCS, we show two types of lines: one with static user situation and the other with dynamic user situation. In Section V we explain the difference between static and dynamic situation, which is that users are always online in the static situation but they can leave the system after accepting sensing task in a dynamic situation. Here, let P i be the probability that a sensing user keep online during data aggregation in the dynamic situation (1 − P i is the probability that the user leave the network after accepting sensing task). According to [16] , we set two reasonable dynamic situations where P i is set as 0.75 and 0.5 respectively. The static situation can be considered as a dynamic situation with P i = 1. Recall that we use the average of data from all delegation users in set D to replace the off-line user's sensing data. Here, we set |D| = 5. For B-PPRM, the simulation is performed in the traditional static situation. Fig. 3(a) shows the computation results for basic BC-MCS scheme and dynamic BC-MCS scheme. We can see that the aggregation time t a grows linearly with the increase of n in both static and dynamic situation. This result can be explained by (1) which indicates that the more data users provide, the more time ENs will spend to compute the weighted average over these data. In basic BC-MCS scheme (static situation), when 10 sensing users provide data, t a is 0.022 seconds. Even n = 100, the aggregation time t a is not more than 0.2 seconds. This is because the aggregation process only consists of many simple addition operations and the communication latency is minimized by the efficient blockchain platform, Hyperledger Sawtooth. This shows our BC-MCS system is practical in the crowdsensing scenario. In the dynamic situation, the aggregation is more complicated because the delegation protocol is run every time user leaves the system, therefore average aggregation time in both dynamic situations P i = 0.75 and P i = 0.5 increases linearly with the number of users. From (10), we also can see that the smaller P i is, the more off-line users there are in the system thus more aggregation time will be spent. In general, the aggregation cost in the dynamic situation is still small for multiple users, not more than 1 second as the number of users increases. By contrary, Fig. 3(b) shows that B-PPRM scheme results in an aggregation cost of about 40s when dealing with 100 sensing users in the system. The root cause of this result is that B-PPRM utilizes time-consuming and costly homomorphic encryption to protect data privacy [21] .
Next, we evaluate the performance of our reputation management scheme. In BC-MCS, reputation management has two stages: local evaluation and global update. We show in Section IV-B that the former is executed in requester's mobile device to give the variation of sensing users' local reputation score and the latter is executed in blockchain to update sensing users' global reputation score. To test the performance of local reputation evaluation, we implement a prototype Android application with Java. Here, we measure the running time and storage consumption for the reputation management process. For local reputation evaluation, Fig. 4(a) shows that the computation time and client storage consumption increase with the number of users since the larger scale of users introduce more complexity for requesters to evaluate each sensing user's local reputation score. With the different user scale, the average computation time is not more than 0.2s on mobile devices and it is considered efficient. In addition, client storage consumption grows linearly as the user scale increases. This can be explained that the size of data stored in the client, which include user local reputation database, user blinding key, and system configuration file, is proportional to the number of users. For mobile devices, storage consumption is low. According to our experiment results, the storage overhead never exceeds 20KB when n = 100.
For global reputation update, Fig. 4(b) shows that the update processing time increases with the number of requesters in the system. Especially, there is a positive correlation between the user scale and update processing time.
Recall that the global reputation score for a user can be updated in the blockchain only after both of N requesters evaluate the local reputation for the user. This is designed to protect the user's local reputation privacy. From (9), It is expected that N determines the computation complexity of global reputation update. Based on our experiment results, the global reputation update process can maintain high efficiency with the growth of requesters. When N = 100, the execution time is at most 0.3s. 
D. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In our reputation management scheme, users' global reputation is integrated by multiple local reputation from requesters, while the local reputation evaluation is determined by (3) and (9) . The key parameters in these equations contain λ, α, β, γ and η w , which should be adjusted to fit specific system setup. λ is the growth rate of Gompertz function to directly control the convergence speed on the change of local reputation, α, β, γ and η w are the weight parameters to represent the different factors' proportion in local reputation evaluation. The experiment is built on the MCS scenario mentioned above, which consists of 10 requesters and 100 sensing users performing 100 sensing tasks. Additionally, among these sensing users, there are honest users providing correct data continually and malicious users providing false data generated between [b L , b U ] randomly. To simulate a real sensing scenario, we add data noise following normal distribution to the data of honest users.
We first analyze the impact of λ on the reputation update process. To describe the reputation status, we select an honest sensing user randomly and record the change of reputation while users performing a series of sensing tasks. Let n t denote the number of sensing tasks that have been completed by users. Here we do not consider the impact of the contextual factor on local reputation in the experiment, thus let η w = 0.
Besides, we set α = 0.3, β = 0.6, and γ = 0.1. From  Fig. 5(a) , we can see that λ control the convergence speed on the change of reputation. the larger λ, the faster users' reputation would converge to 1 when sensing users always contribute honest sensed data. We suggest λ should not be set too larger or too small, otherwise, the extreme value could lead to premature or slow convergence in local reputation evaluation. Thus, the growth rate λ is determined based on the practical system to suit actual demand. Here, we set λ = 0.15 according to our system in the following experiments.
Then, to analyze the sensitivity of α, we select an honest user in the set of sensing users and observe the change of local reputation score with different n t . As shown in Fig. 5(b) , the bigger α is, the slower the local reputation score converges to 1. The reason is that the system parameters α, β and γ meet the condition α + β + γ + η w = 1, thus, the other parameters decrease correspondingly when we increase the value of α. The comprehensive influence of all these factors results in final reputation changes. Additionally, increasing α means increasing the proportion of data distortion factor in local reputation evaluation, the slower convergence phenomenon from experiment illustrates that the factors of data consistency and local rating play a more significant role in changing user local reputation. In the same way, we evaluate the impact of β for our scheme by giving the change of user local reputation with varying n t . The parameter β represents the weight of data consistency in computing new local reputation. The factor of data consistency c i is the most effective factor in our scheme to identify malicious users because only c i could be negative in processing false data to decrease the value of malicious user's local reputation. Here, we select an honest user and a malicious user randomly in the user set to illustrate the impact of β on different type users. As shown in Fig. 5(c) , for honest users, the larger β is, the faster the local reputation score converges to 1. As a major factor, the increment of c i proportion in local reputation must lead to convergence acceleration. For malicious users, β not only determine the convergence speed but also control the effect of identification. When β = 0.2, the local reputation of malicious users fluctuates around 0.5 instead of converging to 0. When β = 0.4, the local reputation of malicious users begin to converge to 0 after 60 sensing tasks. Since the weak sensitivity to false data, these two situations have no ability to identify and resist malicious users. On the other hand, when β = 0.6 or higher, the local reputation of malicious users can converge to 0 regularly. Thus, to avoid the situation where malicious users cannot be identified by the change of local reputation score, c i should be considered as a major factor in local reputation evaluation and β should not be set too small.
For parameter γ , the weight of local rating factor in computing local reputation, its impact on the local reputation evaluation is similar to α. Fig. 5(d) shows the change trend of the local reputation for an honest user with different values of γ . The values of γ are 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0,6, 0.8, respectively. To meet the condition α + β + γ + η w = 1, we set α = β. Analogously, γ has a similar property as α, the larger γ is, the slower local reputation score converges to 1. The reason is that the decrease of α and β make a greater impact on local reputation than the increment of γ . This explains local rating and data distortion are secondary factors affecting the local reputation evaluation. In our following experiments, we set γ = 0.2.
E. LOCAL EVALUATION VS. GLOBAL UPDATE
Our reputation management scheme is divided into two stages: local reputation evaluation and global reputation update. The global reputation gives a comprehensive reputation assessment for sensing users by aggregating all feedback from multiple requesters.
To show the relationship between local evaluation and global update, we randomly select one requester p j and 6 sensing users and monitor the change of their local and global reputation. Among these users, there are 3 honest users providing correct data persistently and 3 malicious data providing false data generated randomly from [b L , b U ]. The change of local reputation score is shown in Fig. 6(a) . For honest users, the local reputation converges to 1 gradually after 70 sensing tasks and their convergence speed follows the same trend. This is because the difference between correct data, sensed by honest users, and truth data is small, the growth rate of their local reputation is similar to each other through the scale of Gompertz function. On the other hand, for malicious users, their local reputation scores converge to 0 with different tendency due to the randomness of false data. For malicious user 1, even though proving false data constantly, his local reputation has a slightly rising when n t < 17 since their initial local reputation is in a high level, which is identical to honest users. Meanwhile, the false data generated randomly is likely to be close to the truth data at the beginning of sensing tasks. Before n t = 40, malicious user 1 maintains a high level local reputation, when n t > 40, his local reputation is less than 0.5 and begin to converge to 0 apparently. For the malicious user 2 and 3, their local reputation converges to 0 regularly without large tendency fluctuation. These two different cases show that the local reputation evaluated by p j has some limitations in evaluating malicious reputation, mostly because of the limitation in p j 's subjectivity and one-sidedness.
As mentioned previously, the global reputation for u i is computed by averaging the changes of u i 's local reputation from each requester in the system. Fig. 6(b) shows the change of users' global reputation score with varying n t . For honest users, the growth tendency of global reputation is similar to that of local reputation. For malicious users, their global reputations converge to 0 gradually at the parallel trend. The case in Fig. 6 (a) where reputation scores of malicious users keep high level do not appear. The reason is the global reputation integrates all local reputations from each requester and give a comprehensive evaluation about user's behavior, that means malicious users cannot gain a high reputation due to occasional or one-sided high local reputation from a certain requester.
F. ROBUSTNESS IN MALICIOUS SITUATION
Our reputation management scheme aims to resist malicious users in BC-MCS, which include malicious server and malicious users. Blockchain technology makes it easier to build an open and transparent computation environment, which ensures security against the malicious server. In this section, we verify the effectiveness of our reputation management scheme in resisting malicious users through various simulations. For the simulated BC-MCS scenario with malicious users, we use the same system setting as before experiment, which means that the number of sensing users is 100 and the number of requesters is 10, each sensing user completes 100 sensing tasks. For system parameters, we set α = 0.3, β = 0.6, γ = 0.1 and do not consider about the impact of contextual factors on reputation management. We bootstrap the reputation management scheme by giving each sensing users the initial local and global reputation score, 0.5. The honest and malicious sensing users in our simulation provide real sensing data and false data, respectively. Let P m be the probability that a sensing user is malicious in the system. We suppose the number of malicious users is less than half of the users. That means P m always less than 0.5. Fig. 7(a) shows that the local reputation score for honest and malicious sensing users changes with the probability of malicious users, P m , varying from 0.1 to 0.4. For honest users, local reputation score constantly increases and converges to 1. This is because honest users can obtain positive feedback with quality data in each local evaluation. As P m increases, the local reputation score grows slower. The reason is that malicious users provide more false data and honest users gain less supports from real sensed data. For malicious users, we can see that the local reputation scores of malicious users converge to 0 faster with great fluctuation as P m increase. When the system contains a set number of malicious users, who randomly generate false data, the sensing data from all users will have a high degree of data distortion and poor data consistency. As P m increase, the severe data distortion and poor data consistency could exacerbate the decrease of malicious users' reputation score. With the same settings, Fig. 7(b) shows the dynamic changes of global reputation score for honest and malicious sensing users versus the probability of malicious users P m . It is clear that the changes in global reputation score for honest and malicious sensing users follow a similar trend as the local reputation score in Fig. 7(a) . However, the global reputation curves of malicious users fluctuate much less than the global reputation curves in Fig. 7(a) , this result is consistent with the conclusion we give in section VII-E. As P m increase, the global reputation of honest user converges to 1 slower and the global reputation of malicious user converges to 0 faster. In our experiment, even P m increase to 0.6, the reputation scheme is still effective in resisting malicious users. We suggest the practical system must limit P m < 0.5 since more malicious users cause more inaccurate in aggregating data and more indistinguishable in identifying malicious behavior. In general, as long as malicious users are less than honest users in the system, the malicious data will always get negative feedback from requesters and their global reputation score will keep decreasing. Besides, the global reputation of users should be restricted between a reasonable range, in this case, malicious users will be locked or deleted from the system when the global reputation reaches the lower bound of the reputation range.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The architecture of traditional MCS systems relies on a centralized server which is vulnerable to the threats of internal or external attacks. In this paper, we first integrate blockchain and edge computing in MCS scenario and propose a BC-MCS system to carry out sensing task efficiently and resist malicious server. Then, we propose a privacypreserving reputation management scheme to protect user privacy (e.g., sensing data, aggregation result, and requester's feedback) and prevent malicious users simultaneously. Our reputation management scheme consists of local reputation evaluation and global reputation update. In the local evaluation stage, the reliability of user data is evaluated by the degree of data distortion, data consistency, local rating, and contextual factors. The requester gives positive or negative feedback for the user's data service based on data reliability. In the global update stage, the user global reputation scores are updated by smart contract based on the average of all feedback from requesters. To overcome the challenge of user dynamics in a real-world scenario, a delegation protocol is designed to improve the adaptability of BC-MCS system on dynamic user scenario. The prototype implementation on Hyperledger Sawtooth and Android client shows that our BC-MCS system introduces low computation overhead for sensing users. Experimental results verify the effectiveness of our reputation management scheme in resisting malicious users.
